Spillovers of prosocial motivation are crucial for the formation of social capital. They facilitate interactions among individuals and create social multipliers that amplify the effects of policy interventions. We conducted a large-scale intervention study among dyads of blood donors to investigate whether social ties lead to motivational spillovers in the decision to donate. The intervention is a randomized phone call making donors aware of a current shortage of their blood type and serving us as an instrument for identifying motivational spillovers. About 40% of a donor's motivation spills over to the other donor, creating a significant social multiplier of 1.78. [100 words]
Introduction
Social capital is thought to engender trust and cooperation between individuals, and to play a potentially important role in economic development (Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 2000; Durlauf 2002 ). Even though this concept eludes a precise definition, economists have converged on the view that spillovers of prosocial motivation spreading from one individual to another are crucial for the formation of social capital within a community. They provide a social fabric, or capital, that makes interactions between individuals easier and less prone to opportunistic exploitation (Bowles and Gintis 2002) . For example, Putnam (2000) famously argued that the decline in civic activities in the US, that previously severed social ties between individuals in communities, caused a sharp reduction in prosocial behavior and hence social capital. Olken (2009) provided empirical support for this argument.
While many papers study indirect outcomes of social capital, few attempt to examine the underlying motivational spillovers. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that individuals are more willing to contribute to public goods if others do so as well (Falk and Fischbacher 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) . Evidence from field experiments shows that informing individuals about prosocial behavior of others increases the individuals' propensity to donate (Frey and Meier 2004; Shang and Croson 2009) . These results are consistent with various different mechanisms: On the one hand, the experimental manipulations could lead to more prosocial behavior as they may be informative about the value of the good cause (Bénabou and Tirole 2003) , or signal social norms (Bénabou and Tirole 2011) . On the other hand, the increase in prosocial behavior could also reflect a genuine response to the other individuals' motivation. While each of these mechanisms has interesting policy implications, the last stands out since it generates a "social multiplier" that lies at the heart of social capital. If prosocial motivation spills over between individuals, any intervention that affects individual motivation will feed back into the community and will have a larger aggregate effect akin to the Keynesian consumption multiplier. Moreover, previous research suggests that such motivational spillovers may rely on social ties that strengthen altruism between individuals (Goette, Huffman and Meier 2006; Twenge et al. 2007; Leider et al. 2009 Leider et al. , 2010 .
In this paper, we investigate whether social ties lead to motivational spillovers for contributing to a public good with diffuse benefits to a large group. We test this hypothesis in the context of voluntary blood donations. Voluntary blood donations are a textbook example of prosocial behavior as donors receive no material compensation but bear the personal cost of giving their blood. Nevertheless, they provide for the majority of blood products used for medical treatments in the developed world (World Health Organization 2011).
We use data comprising the universe of more than 40,000 blood donors registered for blood drives by the Blood Transfusion Service of the Red Cross in Zurich, Switzerland (BTSRC). As social ties are fostered by closeness in space (Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006; Goette, Huffman and Meier 2006) and age (Marsden 1988; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Kalmijn and Vermunt 2007) , we focus on the 7,446 donors in our sample who live at an address with a fellow tenant who is also a donor in the same blood drive, and who is within less than 20 years difference in age. Over the sample period from April 2011 to January 2013, these donors are invited repeatedly to blood drives, creating 10,120 observations of dyads deciding whether or not to donate. An estimate 66 percent of them are cohabiting couples. Since social ties within these dyads are most likely, we can test if prosocial motivation spreads within them.
Identifying motivational spillovers is difficult (Manski 2000; Durlauf 2002 ): simply observing a correlation in behavior within dyads is not necessarily evidence of motivational spillovers. Both donors may be exposed to a similar environment, thus experiencing correlated shocks to their motivation that generate an omitted-variable bias which exaggerates the causal effect of motivational spillovers. Furthermore, the presence of motivational spillovers itself creates an endogeneity problem between the two individuals within a dyad.
If motivation spills from one individual to her fellow tenant, that motivation (partly) spills back, causing an endogeneity bias also known as the reflection problem (Manski 1993) .
In order to cut through these potential biases, one needs an instrument that affects a donor's motivation without directly impacting her fellow tenant. We use a phone call to a random subset of the invited donors two days before the blood drive, urging them to donate because their blood type is in short supply at the moment. Receiving such a phone call directly increases the recipient's motivation to give blood (Bruhin and Goette 2014) , but leaves her fellow tenant's motivation unaffected, unless the donors within the dyad interact.
We apply the linear-in-means model by Manski (1993) in a bivariate probit specification.
This allows us to empirically identify motivational spillovers using the randomized phone call as an instrument, without imposing restrictive assumptions on how contextual effects affect donations. Furthermore, it enables us to distinguish motivational spillovers from so-called exogenous social interaction effects. With motivational spillovers, a donor's motivation to give blood is affected by her fellow tenant's motivation, whereas under exogenous social interaction, it is influenced by the fellow tenant's characteristics. The distinction between these two types of social interaction is policy relevant. As motivational spillovers go in both directions and result in a feedback loop between the individuals, they create a "social multiplier" that could greatly amplify the effectiveness of policy interventions. Exogenous social interaction, on the other hand, goes just in one direction and does not create any social multipliers.
We find strong evidence for motivational spillovers: our estimates imply that 40 percent of a fellow tenant's motivation spills over to one's own motivation to donate. These spillovers generate a significant social multiplier of 1.78: i.e., any intervention that increases an individual's propensity to donate by, say, 10 percent leads to an aggregate increase in donation rates by almost 18 percent. By contrast, we find no evidence that a fellow tenant's characteristics, such as age, gender or previous donation history affects one's donation decision apart from their direct effect on the fellow tenant's motivation.
An important concern in our context is that it is not the donor's motivation that is transmitted, but rather the information about the scarcity of a specific blood type that the phone call conveys. However, we are able to check the validity of the exclusion restriction of our instrument in two ways. First, we examine whether a phone call to a fellow tenant with a different blood type also affects one's probability to donate. If it were only the information about the temporary shortage of a specific blood type that was transmitted, the effect should be absent for fellow tenants with a different blood type, or at least significantly weaker. However, we find the same effect as for fellow tenants with the same blood type.
Furthermore, we can check if a phone call to a fellow tenant is ineffective if the donor himself also was called by the BTSRC. Again, if only the information mattered, we would expect the effect to be weaker if both members of a dyad received a phone call, but we find no evidence thereof. While, ultimately, exclusion restrictions always remain untestable, our two validity checks rule out an important class of alternative explanations for our findings.
We also explore the role of the nonlinearity in our estimation results by reestimating our model by two-stage least squares (TSLS). Although the models differ slightly in their interpretation, we also find significant spillover effects in the TSLS specification, and virtually the same implied social multiplier.
An interesting question is whether our results are driven by the subset of roughly 66 percent of cohabitating (opposite-sex) couples in our data. The panel structure of our data and the modeling of the donors' decisions within a bivariate probit model lends itself to a straightforward analysis of heterogeneity of this sort with a finite mixture model. When we search the data for heterogeneity of this sort, we find no evidence of distinct types of dyads. Since a finite mixture model with more than one type of dyads overfits the data, it seems that motivational spillovers, in the case of blood donations, are equally present in cohabiting couples as well as among fellow tenants.
Overall, our study provides strong support for the notion that prosocial motivation directed at third parties can spill over between individuals with social ties. Thus, these spillovers are not confined to solely motivations benefiting the individual with whom the ties exist. These motivational spillovers alter the cost-benefit calculations of a behavioral intervention in important ways: with our estimated spillover of 40 percent onto the fellow tenant, they magnify the change in motivation due to the phone call by 1/(1 − 0.4
2 )
for the individual called, and raise motivation by a fraction 0.4/(1 − 0.4 2 ) of its original impact. Overall, the resulting social multiplier of 1/(1 − 0.4) = 1.78 nearly doubles the effectiveness of the behavioral intervention. Consequently, this affects optimal policy, as the behavioral intervention has substantially higher benefits when targeted towards dyads instead of isolated individuals.
This study also contributes to the existing empirical literature on voluntary blood donation. Most of this literature focuses on the direct effects of policy interventions on donor motivation (for examples see Goette and Stutzer (2008) ; Goette et al. (2009); Lacetera and Macis (2012b); Niessen-Ruenzi, Weber and Becker (2014) ). However our study shows that any such intervention may also affect donors that were assigned as controls in these studies, thus possibly underestimating the treatment effects. This bias can be substantial:
assuming the worst case scenario that one donor in a dyad is in the treated group and the other is in the control, the estimated treatment effect will be attenuated by a factor of 1/(1 + 0.44) ≈ 0.7.
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Furthermore, the present study also adds to the broader literature on social interaction that highlights the importance of social multipliers in various contexts. For example, Cipollone and Rosolia (2007) find strong social interaction within high schools, where an increment in the boys' graduation rate leads to an increase in the girls' graduation rate.
Similarly, Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) conclude that when a child stays longer in school, his friends stay longer too. Borjas and Dorani (2014) discover strong knowledge spillovers in collaboration spaces when high-quality researchers directly engage with other researchers in the joint production of new knowledge. Finally, Kessler (2013) shows in an experimental study that subjects making non-binding announcements of their contributions to a public good motivate other subjects to contribute as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set, how we isolate dyads of donors with potential social ties, and the phone call we use as the instrument for identifying motivational spillovers. Section 3 presents the econometric analysis. Section 4 discusses the results and presents some robustness checks. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Data Set
This section discusses the origin and structure of the panel data set, how we isolate dyads of donors with potential social ties, and the instrument for identifying the motivational spillovers.
1 Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2014) studied indirect effects of interventions of a different type: they find in a randomized field experiment that incentive offers made to some donors also increase donation rates of other donors. However, this spillover effect is partially explained by a spatial displacement effect, i.e. a substantial number of donors shifts from blood drives without incentives to neighboring blood drives that offer incentives.
Origin and Structure
The panel data set originates form the BTSRC and contains information about all blood drives that took place in the canton of Zurich between April 2011 to January 2013. observations.
For each observation, the data set contains the following information: a binary indicator whether the donor gave blood at the blood drive she was invited to, the donor's street, house number, and zip code, as well as her age, gender, blood type, and the number of donations she made in the year prior to the beginning of the study. Moreover, we also observe whether the donor additionally received a phone call, informing her that her blood type is currently in short supply.
Identifying potential social ties
To test for motivational spillovers, we aim to focus on individuals with strong social ties.
However, in our data set, we only observe a limited set of the donors' characteristics. Thus, we draw on earlier evidence that shows that proximity is an important predictor of social ties. Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006) show that random allocations to university dorms are strong predictors of subsequent friendships. Similarly, Goette, Huffman and Meier (2006) find that random allocations to platoons in a training unit in the Swiss Army immediately lead to strong social ties between individuals. Secondly, we draw on evidence that friends are often very close in age: several studies document that friendship pairs have very small age differences, with roughly 90 percent of the friendship pairs having an age difference of less than 20 years (Marsden 1988; McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook 2001; Kalmijn and Vermunt 2007) .
In this spirit, we define groups of fellow tenants, registered for the same blood drive, by exploiting the available information on the donors' place of residence. Note, however, that for reasons of data protection, we only observe the donors' addresses but not whether they live in the same household.
We restrict attention to pairs of donors, i. couples, but about one-third is not. This raises the question of whether the social ties might be weaker for the latter group than for the former. In section 3.3, we will address this question explicitly by formally examining heterogeneity in our sample. 
Instrument for Identifying the Effects of Social Interaction
As mentioned in the introduction, the BTSRC uses phone calls to invited donors to increase turnout for blood types that are in particularly short supply. These phone calls are highly effective, raising donation rates by roughly 8 percentage points from the baseline (Bruhin and Goette 2014) . Therefore, the intervention satisfies the criterion that it affects the donor's motivation. In order to be a valid instrument, we also need to assert that the phone call itself does not affect the fellow tenant's motivation directly, i.e. that it satisfies the exclusion restriction. In part, this is guaranteed by the institutional setup. The BTSRC reaches the registered donors during office hours on their mobile phones. Each phone call provides the same information about the upcoming blood drive, stating explicitly: "Your blood type X is in short supply, please come and donate at the upcoming blood drive." Since the phone call reaches the recipient during office hours on her mobile phone, it does not directly affect the motivation of the fellow tenant who is most likely not present at that time. Moreover we are going to present two validity checks in subsection 4.2 that address these issues more explicitly. Table 3 verifies that, conditional on blood types, the phone calls are barely correlated with other individual characteristics. The correlation of the phone calls with gender is not significant. Their correlation with age is statistically significant but very small in magnitude.
For example, the probability of receiving a phone call decreases by only 0.1 percentage points for every additional 10 years of age. The phone calls also show no clear correlation pattern with the donation history in the year prior to the onset of the study. In fact, the corresponding coefficients are jointly significant in specification (1), without fixed effects, and specification (2), with fixed effects for the location of the blood drives (location fixed Individual cluster robust standard errors in parentheses.
Levels of significance:
effects). But they are jointly insignificant in specification (3), with both location and month fixed effects (F-tests for joint significance (1) p-value: 0.001, (2) p-value: 0.002, (3) p-value:
0.225). Note that the correlations in specification (1) and (2) between the phone calls and the donation history result by construction, because new donors entered the data set while the study was ongoing. These new donors' donation history was necessarily zero at the time they received their first phone call. Because the month fixed effects pick up the resulting correlations, they are jointly insignificant in specification (3). Finally, the phone calls are strongly correlated with blood types. Their incidence is higher for negative blood types which can be used more flexibly. The BTSRC especially favors blood type O-negative which is universally compatible with any other blood type.
Econometric Analysis
This section presents the econometric analysis for identifying motivational spillovers. It first introduces the structural model and formally discusses the identification strategy. Subsequently, it briefly outlines the estimation procedure and our approach for dealing with potential behavioral heterogeneity.
Structural Model
The structural model is based on the linear-in-means model by Manski (1993) . The motivation of donor i in dyad d to give blood is
For notational convenience we drop the subscript t for the invitation to an upcoming blood drive in this subsection. β 0 is a constant, measuring baseline motivation. Y * −id indicates the motivation of i's fellow tenant. Thus, the parameter δ captures the extent to which donor motivation spills over within dyads. X id represents donor i's individual characteristics, including gender, age, blood type, and dummies for the number of donations in the year before the study began. X −id are the same individual characteristics of i's fellow tenant.
Hence, the parameter vector β 2 measures the effects of exogenous social interaction.
Since the decision whether or not to donate, Y id , is binary and we study dyads of donors, we can estimate a bivariate probit model to capture the simultaneous decision-making of the two fellow tenants in each dyad.
We assume the error terms 1d and 2d to be bivariate normally distributed, with E( 1d ) = E( 2d ) = 0, Var( 1d ) = Var( 2d ) = 1, and Cor( 1d , 2d ) = ρ. The correlation between the random errors, ρ, captures both potentially omitted exogenous effects such as health status and education as well as correlated effects such as sharing a common environment.
Substituting equation 3.3 into 3.2 yields the reduced form,
and the analogous expression for the fellow tenant:
The equations highlight the identification problem of motivational spillovers: we have three independent variables (the constant, X 1d , and X 2d ), but four unknown parameters β 0 , β 1 , β 2 , and δ. If we assumed that ρ = 0, then the functional form induced by the normality assumption over the residuals 1d and 2d would allow us to identify δ. To see why this is true, note that the error terms in (3.4) and (3.5) are linear combinations of the structural residuals 1d and 2d . Thus, when ρ = 0, one can identify δ off the correlation of these residuals. However, when ρ = 0, this in itself introduces a correlation in the residuals, leaving δ unidentified. In our context, ρ could reflect omitted exogenous effects or unobservable common shocks to the motivation stemming from similar environments, thus making identification suspect if one imposed ρ = 0.
This identification problem can be resolved by introducing the phone calls to the donors discussed in section 2.3. Within our model, they take on the role akin to an instrument in a TSLS estimation. Denote by P id the binary variable indicating whether donor i in dyad d has received a phone call for the current invitation. As we argued above, a critical feature of this phone call is that it directly affects donor i's motivation, but not that of the fellow tenant. The econometric model then becomes
Substituting equation 3.7 into 3.6 yields the following reduced form:
Note that the impact of the phone call P 1d on donor 1's motivation is given by γ 1−δ 2 because of the motivational spillovers that go back and forth between the two fellow tenants (and amplify the response to the phone call if 0 < δ < 1). Its impact on donor 2, δ γ 1−δ 2 , is different though, as only a fraction δ of the motivation spills over to donor 2 (and because the phone call has no direct impact on donor 2). This allows us to identify the parameter δ for motivational spillovers by dividing the reduced-form coefficient of donor 2's phone call by the reduced-form coefficient of donor 1's phone call.
Having obtained δ, we can identify all remaining structural parameters: as is obvious from the reduced form above, all other parameters are uniquely identified once δ is recovered, and we can use standard methods to calculate their standard errors. 
Estimation
We estimate the parameters of the bivariate probit model, θ = (β 0 , β 1 , β 2 , γ, δ, ρ) , using the method of maximum likelihood. Dyad d's contribution to the model's density is
where
and Φ 2 is the cumulative distribution function of the bivariate normal distribution (Greene 2003) . Equation 3.9 directly yields the model's log likelihood,
(3.10)
As the T d observations of dyad d may be serially correlated, we estimate dyad cluster-robust standard errors using the sandwich estimator (Huber 1967; Wooldridge 2002) . To control for potential heterogeneity across the locations and months of the blood drives, we include location and month fixed effects.
Testing for Behavioral Heterogeneity
In order to explore whether there is behavioral heterogeneity in the sense that there may exist distinct types of dyads that differ in the extent and type of social interaction, we estimate a finite mixture model 6 . As pointed out before, an estimated 66 percent of our donors are cohabiting couples, and it is possible that social ties with regard to blood donations are stronger within cohabiting couples than between the remaining fellow tenants.
Moreover, prosocial behavior is known to be heterogeneous (e.g. Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (2001) ), as there may exist several distinct social preference types (Breitmoser 2013; Iriberri and Rey-Biel 2013; Bruhin, Fehr and Schunk 2014; Bruhin and Goette 2014) . Thus, extending the pooled bivariate probit model to account for behavioral heterogeneity could yield important additional insights.
The finite mixture model relaxes the assumption that there exists just one representative dyad in the population. Instead, it allows the population to be made up by K distinct types of dyads differing in the extent of social interaction. Consequently, the parameter vector θ k is no longer representative for all dyads but rather depends on the type of the dyads as indicated by the subscript k. Thus, dyad d's contribution to the likelihood of the finite mixture model,
equals the sum over all K type-specific densities,
weighted by the relative sizes of the corresponding types π k . Since we do not know a priori to which type dyad d belongs, the types' relative sizes, π k , may be interpreted as ex-ante probabilities of typemembership. Hence, the log likelihood of the finite mixture model is given by 12) where the vector Ψ = (π 1 , . . . , π K−1 , θ 1 , . . . , θ K ) contains all parameters of the model.
Once we obtained the parameter estimates of the finite mixture model,Ψ, we can classify each dyad into the type it most likely belongs to. In particular, we apply Bayes' rule to calculate the dyad's ex-post probabilities of type-membership given the parameter estimates of the finite mixture model,
Note that the true number of distinct types in the population is unknown. Thus, a
6 Finite mixture models have become increasingly popular to uncover latent heterogeneity in various fields of behavioral economics (for recent examples see Houser, Keane and McCabe (2004) ; Harrison and Rutström (2009) ; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper (2010) ; Conte, Hey and Moffat (2011); Breitmoser (2013) ; Bruhin and Goette (2014) To determine the optimal number of distinct types, K * , we approximate the Normalized
Integrate Complete Likelihood (Biernacki, Celeux and Govaert (2000a) ) by applying the
ICL-BIC criterion (McLachlan and Peel 2000)
,
The ICL-BIC is based on the BIC, but additionally features an entropy term that acts as a penalty for an ambiguous classification of dyads into types. If the classification is clean, the K types are well segregated and almost all dyads exhibit ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τ dk , that are all either close to 0 or 1. In that case, the entropy term is almost 0 and the ICL-BIC nearly coincides with the BIC. However, if the classification is ambiguous, some of the K types overlap and many dyads exhibit ex-post probabilities of type-membership in the vicinity of 1/K. In that case, the absolute value of the entropy term is large, indicating that finite mixture model overfits the data and tries to identify types that do not exist. Thus, to determine the optimal number of types, we need to minimize the ICL-BIC with respect to K.
Results
This section presents the results of the econometric analysis of the effects of motivational spillovers on donor motivation. First, it discusses the estimated coefficients of the bivariate probit model in our baseline specification. It then proceeds with two validity checks on 7 Lo, Mendell and Rubin (2001) proposed a statistical test (LMR-test) to select among finite mixture models with varying numbers of types, which is based on Vuong (1989) 's test for non-nested models. However, the LMR-test is unlikely to be suitable when the alternative model is a single-type model with strongly non-normal outcomes Muthén (2003) .
the instruments to rule out that the mechanism is information passed on between donors, rather than motivation. Subsequently, it shows the finite mixture estimation that allows us to search for behavioral heterogeneity. We also reestimate the baseline specification using TSLS in order to minimize the role of functional-form assumptions in our estimates. Finally, we examine the robustness of our result with respect to the age restrictions that we impose on the dyads. Table 4 shows the estimated coefficients for the structural equation of three different specifications of the bivariate probit model. Column (1) shows the estimates of the specification without fixed effects. Column (2) shows the estimates of the specification with location fixed effects, while the specification in column (3) additionally controls for month fixed effects.
Main Results
We add fixed effects to avoid confounds that may arise since the blood drives took place at different locations and points in time. Location fixed effects absorb differences between urban and rural areas as well as among the local organizers of the blood drives. Month fixed effects pick up seasonal fluctuations or special events that influence donor motivation, such as school holidays.
The results show that the phone call has a large and significant effect on the probability to donate. The coefficient γ is positive, and estimated with considerable precision, with a zstatistic of well over 3. Its absolute magnitude is not directly interpretable, as it reflects the impact of the phone call on the donor's motivation, Y * , and not directly on the probability to donate. In order to express the effect on the probability to donate, we have to calculate its marginal probability effect as defined in equation (A.2) in the appendix. These calculations reveal that the probability to donate increases by 9 percentage points upon receiving a phone call, a sizable increase over the baseline donation rate of 32 percent. This estimate is virtually identical to the effect found in Bruhin and Goette (2014) , who estimate the impact of the phone call on turnout in the entire population of blood donors, most of whom do not have a fellow tenant registered as a donor. Thus, focusing on dyads does not induce selectivity in terms of how strongly individuals react to the phone call.
Turning to our main interest, the parameter δ for motivational spillovers is significant in all three specifications, and hovering around 0.4. This implies that of a one-unit increase in the fellow tenant's motivation to donate roughly 40 percent spills over to the other donor in the dyad. That a donor's motivation to give blood strongly depends on her fellow tenant's motivation. This spillover generates a substantial "social multiplier" for any intervention.
In our calculations for the effectiveness of the phone call above, we deliberate shut out the motivational spillovers between fellow tenants. To see how the phone call affects both donors, consider how the phone call to donor 1 changes her motivation to give blood Y * 1 :
its effect depends both on the phone call, and on the feedback induced by her fellow tenant, donor 2. Thus, ∆Y * 1 = γ + δ∆Y * 2 . Similarly, the fellow tenant is affect indirectly and her motivation increases by ∆Y * 2 = δ∆Y * 1 . Solving this system of two equations yields ∆Y * 1 = γ/(1 − δ 2 ) and ∆Y * 2 = γδ/(1 − δ 2 ). Thus, the social multiplier is 1/(1 − δ 2 ) for the individual receiving the call, and a fraction δ of that for the fellow tenant.
Our baseline estimate of δ = 0.44 implies a substantial social multiplier, since 1/(1 − 0.44 2 ) = 1.24 for donor 1 and 0.44/(1 − 0.44 2 ) = 0.54 for her fellow tenant, donor 2.
When calculating the marginal effect of a phone call taking into account these feedback effects (detailed in equations (A.3) and (A.4)), we find that the increase in the probability of donating for donor 1 is 12 percentage points, and that the increase in the probability to donate for donor 2 is roughly 5 percentage points after donor 1 received a phone call.
Thus, motivational spillovers substantially increase the BTSRC's return to a phone call: it produces an aggregate 17 percentage higher donation rather than the 9 percentage points without motivational spillovers.
Individual characteristics matter for donor motivation as well. Male donors are significantly more likely to give blood than female donors. This gender effect is robust and quantitatively important. In terms of magnitude, the male dummy corresponds approximately to a ten-year difference in age. Donation rates also increase significantly with age.
This finding is robust across all three specifications and consistent with the result in many other studies (Wildman and Hollingsworth 2009; Slonim 2012a, 2014) .
As in Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) we find that donations in the year before entering the study predicts blood donations: the coefficients for the number of donations made prior to the beginning of the study reveal that regular donors are more likely to donate than irregular donors. Finally, blood types have no significant effect on donor motivation (Waldtest for joint significance of all blood types, p > 0.4 in all cases). In particular, donors with highly demanded, negative blood types do not donate more frequently (Wald-test for joint significance of negative blood types, p > 0.6 in all cases).
We find only weak evidence of exogenous social interactions, i.e. an impact of one fellow tenant's characteristic on the donation decision of the other, holding Y * −1 constant. In general, the corresponding individual characteristics have small coefficients, and most of them are not individually significant. A joint F-test also reveals considerable fragility: adding location and month fixed effects knocks the F-statistics below the conventional levels of significance.
The estimates of ρ are between −0.2 and −0.3, depending on the specification, and are estimated with very little precision: in each of the specifications, the standard error is roughly 0.4. These imprecise estimates leave a rather large confidence band, thus highlighting again the advantage of not relying on assumptions about ρ to identify our parameter of interest δ. 
Validity Checks on the Instruments
The crucial identifying assumption for the validity of our identification strategy is that only one's own phone call has a direct impact on one's own motivation, and not the fellow tenant's phone call directly. As we argued before, in terms of who is answering the phone call, this is a plausible assumption, as the phone calls are made to cell phones during office hours.
However, one could argue that it is not only the fellow tenant's motivation that may spill over, but also the information the fellow tenant received with this phone call. While ultimately, the identifying assumption remains just that, an assumption, our setup allows us to rule out two plausible sorts of such informational spillovers.
Our first test relies on differences in blood types within dyads. Recall that the phone call is made as a function of the scarcity of certain blood types, and this information is conveyed to the donor very clearly. If it is information about the scarcity, rather than information about one's motivation that is passed on between donors, then this effect should be stronger if the fellow tenants have the same blood type.
In order to test for this possibility, we augment the reduced form in the bivariate probit by interacting the phone call with the indicator S d = 1 if both donors have the same blood type. We add the interaction with both, one's own phone call and the fellow tenant's phone call, since if δ > 0 in the structural equation and both terms appear in the reduced form.
Thus, we estimate
If information about the scarcity of the blood type is passed on fellow tenants, we'd expect ξ 2 to diminish relative to the baseline specification, and ξ 3 and ξ 4 to be significantly positive. Table 5 displays the result. In the first two columns, it shows the reduced forms of the baseline specification with and without the indicator S d . The third column, labeled "Validity Check 1", exhibits the the estimates of equation (4.1). As can be seen, the coefficients and standard errors on one's own phone call and the fellow tenant's phone call remain virtually unchanged. Furthermore, neither interaction with the same blood type within a dyad is statistically significant.
Thus, there is little evidence that information about the specific scarcity of the blood type is transmitted within dyads in a way that affects donations, while the two parameters identifying motivational spillovers are virtually unchanged.
A second, less specific way of checking for informational spillovers that would invalidate our identification strategy is based on the intuition that the phone calls may simply serve as a reminder of the blood drive. It is possible that that the phone call to one fellow tenant also reminds the other of the blood drive. In this case, a fellow tenant's phone call should have less of an effect on the other if the other received a phone call as well. This can be tested by augmenting the reduced form by an interaction between the two phone calls P id × P −id . Under this sort of informational spillover, the coefficient of the interaction should be significantly negative. Thus, we estimate the equation
The results of this validity check are displayed in the fourth column, labelled "Validity check 2" in Table 5 . As can be seen, the point estimate of the interaction of the two phone calls is positive -the opposite of what one would expect if information about the drive was transmitted -and insignificant. Again, the two coefficients of the phone calls used to identify motivational spillovers are virtually unchanged and significant. Hence, there is no evidence against the validity of our instrument based on this more general sort of informational spillover about the blood.
Behavioral Heterogeneity
We next turn to examining heterogeneity with respect to the motivational spillovers. As discussed in section 2.2, our sample contains approximately 66 percent cohabiting couples and 34 percent neighbors at the same address. The motivational spillovers are possibly weaker among neighbors than among cohabiting couples. Furthermore, there is evidence of behavioral heterogeneity with respect to prosocial motivations, thus generating a further source of heterogeneity. We therefore estimate a finite mixture model that would pick up this sort of heterogeneity by identifying the different types of dyads.
However, the estimates of the finite mixture model provide no evidence for the existence of different types of dyads with distinct behavioral patterns. As shown in table 6, the ICL-BIC reaches its lowest value for a model with K * = 1, i.e., one representative type.
In particular, the ambiguity in the classification of dyads into types, as measured by the entropy in the ICL-BIC, is very large for models with more than one type. Hence, these models are overspecified and fit random noise rather than distinct types of dyads. Table 6 : ICL-BIC for determining the optimal number of types in a finite mixture model Figure 1 shows the distribution of the ex-post probabilities of type-membership, τ dk , for a finite mixture model with K = 2 types. It reveals that the classification of dyads into types is indeed highly ambiguous as the τ dk of many dyads lie between 0 and 1. Thus, there is considerable overlap between the two types the model tries to identify. As illustrated in figure 2 , the ambiguity in the dyads' classification into types becomes even more pronounced in the finite mixture model with K = 3 types. Therefore, our results indicate that our baseline specification is a valid and parsimonious representation of the data. 
TSLS estimation of the "social multiplier"
In our baseline results, we use the bivariate probit model as our model of choice, as it follows directly from the random utility specification we adopt and allows us to model motivational spillovers explicitly. Furthermore, it also lends itself easily to be augmented for the finite mixture model in our search for behavioral heterogeneity. On the other hand, the model imposes more structure than is necessary to simply estimate the social multiplier in behavior. In this subsection, we reestimate our baseline model using a linear probability model and applying an instrumental variable (IV) strategy to estimate the effect of a fellow tenant's donation on the other's decision to give blood. As long as the conditional mean independence assumption and the exclusion restrictions are satisfied, this model provides a consistent estimate of the behavioral spillovers (Moffitt 1999) . Estimating the linear probability model using an IV strategy allows us to see if the added "non-linearities" of the bivariate probit model bear any importance to our central conclusion of the paper, namely the quantitatively large social multiplier implied by our baseline results.
We apply the basic TSLS procedure to estimate the linear probability model. In the first stage, we predict the fellow tenant's donation,Ŷ 2dt , using the instrumental variable,
, and all exogenous variables by estimating the following linear model 8 :
In the second stage, we regress the other donor's decision to give blood, Y 1dt , on the fellow tenant's predicted donation,Ŷ 2dt , and all exogenous variables:
(4.4) Table 7 reports the estimated second-stage coefficients for three different specifications.
Column (1) shows the estimated coefficients without any fixed effects, column (2) includes location fixed effects, while (3) additionally includes month fixed effects. In sum, the linear probability model yields qualitatively the same results as the bivariate probit model. Donors who receive a phone call are about 8 percentage points more likely to donate blood than donors who do not receive such a phone call. As in the bivariate probit model, this effect is highly statistically significant and robust. The instrument easily passes the the standard tests for strong instruments (F-statics in the first stage: (1) 39.31, (2) 38.02, (3) 30.27, see Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) ). Thus, in terms of the effectiveness of the phone call, the TSLS estimates are virtually identical to the marginal effects obtained from our baseline specification.
We observe strong and significant endogenous social interaction which is robust to fixed effects. A donor's probability to give blood increases by about 40 percentage points if her fellow tenant donates. In this model, again, the social multiplier is given by 1/(1 − δ 2 ).
With a value of about 1.25, it lies in the same range as in the bivariate probit model. Similarly, the evidence of exogenous social interactions is weak in this specification as well.
The role of the age restriction
Perhaps the most arbitrary restriction in creating our sample is that we only consider dyads of fellow tenants with an age difference of less than 20 years. We motivated this restriction with previous evidence showing that individuals with strong social ties are most often close in age. However, it is nevertheless instructive to examine its role in our estimations. We reestimate the baseline specifications of the bivariate probit model in two alternative samples: one with an even stricter restriction on the intra-dyad age difference of less than 10 years, and one with no such age restriction at all. Table 8 displays the results. We present the estimation results in a more compact form, focusing only on the estimates of the motivation spillovers δ, the impact of the phone call γ, and the estimate of the correlations in unobservables ρ to assess the sensitivity of our baseline estimates with regard to the different specifications of the age cutoff.
Panel A of table 8 shows the estimates for the first sample with the 10-year restriction on the intra-dyad age difference. This eliminates 509 dyads from our sample, shrinking the number of observations to 8, 811. The best available evidence (Kalmijn and Vermunt 2007) suggest that roughly 15 percent of one's close social ties have an age difference of more than 10 years. Since our restriction eliminates roughly the same number of dyads, this should not lead to a notable change in the likelihood of social ties within our sample. Consistent with this interpretation, the point estimates of δ are almost exactly the same as in our baseline specification, or perhaps slightly higher. This is also true for the other parameters of the model, as can be seen by the similarity of of the estimates for γ and ρ.
When we consider the second sample with no age restriction, the number of dyads increases from 3, 723 to 5, 053, a 35 percent increase. By contrast, evidence suggests that only roughly 10 percent of all social ties involve age differences of more than 20 years. Thus, relaxing the age restriction should add a disproportionate share of observations without social ties, which could decrease our estimates of δ. Panel B of table 8 displays the results.
Indeed, there is somewhat of a decrease in the estimate of the spillover effects, though they remain within one standard error of our baseline estimates for each of the specifications, and are still significant for two of the three models. As before, there is virtually no change in the point estimate or precision of, i.e., the effectiveness of the phone call. Thus, there is no evidence that the additional observations generally are less predictable.
Overall, our conclusions are not sensitive to the age restriction. The point estimates do vary in the direction predicted by the evidence on social ties and age differences, with the point estimates being somewhat larger when the age restriction is tighter than when it is loosened; in particular when it adds a lot of observations known to be unlikely candidates for social ties.
Within our framework, we could also examine the sensitivity of our results by explicitly making ρ dependent on the age difference. Intuitively, this would add the interaction between the fellow tenant's phone call and the intra-dyad age difference as a restriction as an additional variable to the structural form equations 3.6 and 3.7. However, while our instrument is strong for the baseline specification, the instruments also using the interaction with the age difference fails the Kleinbergen-Paap criterion (Kleibergen and Paap 2006) , possibly due to the collinearity between the two instruments. Due to this inherent source of ambiguity, we refrain from further exploring the issue. Overall, motivational spillovers have a forceful impact on donor motivation, as they generate a social multiplier that amplifies the direct impact of phone calls by 78 percent.
It remains an open question as to what the precise psychological mechanism is behind the behavioral evidence of motivational spillovers. It may simply be more enjoyable to undertake an activity together, irrespective of whether it is a prosocial activity or not: going to an event in the company of a person with whom one has social ties may provide for better conservations on the way and while waiting. Alternatively, there may be image motivation involved specific to the prosocial activity, as one's fellow tenant witnesses one's prosocial act, in the spirit of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) . It is also possible that our results pick up the interplay between pro-social individuals and conformists, who are more likely to donate if other do so as well, as suggested in Sliwka (2007) . Surprisingly, there is no evidence for the existence different types of dyads that qualitatively differ in the extent or type of social interaction. Thus, explanations that rely on image motivation may be less intuitively appealing, as impressing one's spouse may not be quite so easy by simply donating blood.
Ultimately, while our paper provides robust evidence for motivational spillovers, it is unable to pin down the precise psychological mechanism behind it. This does not, however, affect their policy relevance for the application at hand. 
Taking the ratio of the coefficients of P 2d and P 1d yields
Once δ is identified, the other parameters can be derived too:
The standard errors of the structural form parameters can be computed by delta-method:
A.2 Marginal effects in the bivariate probit model
The discrete probability effect of the phone reminder holding the social interaction effects constant is given by
The change in the probability of donation of the individual receiving the phone call, and taking into account the feedback loops with the fellow tenant's motivation is given by
where 1/(1 − δ 2 ) is the social multiplier discussed in section 4. Similarly, the effect on the fellow tenant not receiving a phone call is given by
where δ/(1 − δ 2 ) is the spillover onto the fellow tenant who has not received the phone call.
A.3 Pooled bivariate probit model without age restriction A.5 First stages of 2SLS 
A.4 Finite mixture regression results

